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KRISTIN K. MAYES, Chairman PAUL NEWMAN GARY PIERCE SANDRA D. KENNEDY BOB STUMP

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IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERIC PROCEEDING CONCERNING ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING ISSUES. Docket No. E-00000A-02-0051

IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERIC PROCEEDING CONCERNING THE ARIZONA INDEPENDENT SCHEDULING ADMINISTRATOR.

Docket No. E-00000A-01-0630

MOHAVE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE AND VOPACHE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE COMMENTS ON TAIL ELECTRIC COMPETITION REQUESTED BY THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

These Comments by Mohave Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Navopache Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("Cooperatives"), supplement the Comments filed by the Grand Canyon State Electric Cooperative Association on behalf of its Arizona members. Such Comments and collective comments are adopted herein by this reference thereto.

I. General Comments: Whether Retail Electric Competition Is In The Public Interest

No, not at this time. The structures and mechanisms necessary to successfully introduce retail electric competition are not yet demonstrated to exist and do not exist in Arizona and are not expected to exist in Arizona for some time.

Why Are Cooperatives Different? II.

Cooperatives were created to serve in areas disavowed by private investor owned companies because their economics were such that shareholders could not be guaranteed a return which would meet expectations. Whether people needed electricity or not, there was no service

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except distributed generation in the form of coal lanterns, oil lanterns, fireplaces and automotive engines running on gasoline. The country was in a great depression.

The Rural Electric program was created during the depression to bring the benefits of electricity and wide spread use in essentially rural areas and to promote public health, welfare and economic growth. Certain economic principles were created in this program to make it work and these continue today under the auspices of the Rural Utilities Services, an agency in the Department of Agriculture.

In order for Cooperatives to secure the benefits of financing electric power plant construction and electric distribution system construction and operation in mostly remote and rural areas and in those areas which are urbanizing, Cooperatives rely on the Rural Utilities ("RUS") which, as a Federal lender, requires a comprehensive study of need and a pay-back analysis and giving of a mortgage before making a loan; and the National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation ("NRUCFC") and co-bank which, as supplemental lenders to Cooperatives, all require collateral for the loan, territorial integrity, and a pay-back analysis and a mortgage subordinated to the financing of RUS. Most Arizona cooperatives rely on these sources of financing. One of the conditions for lending money to these rural electric cooperatives is that they demonstrate to the lenders a need for the facilities and an ability to repay the loan based on territorial integrity and a solid customer base. It is the territorial integrity of the service area of the Cooperative with a solid customer base that acts as a partial guarantee of the fiscal security of the loan and its ability to be repaid. Absent a guarantee of service area integrity and fiscal integrity, financing of the needs of most Arizona cooperatives would be impossible or improbable. There would be no guarantee or assurance to lenders of revenues from consumers sufficient to repay the cost of power production and facility infrastructure. The Cooperatives have grave doubts as to whether retail electric

competition introduced at this time of economic depression will benefit rural Arizona.

Competition in the electric industry does not, in and of itself, automatically carry benefits to consumers. Experience in the airline, banking and telecommunications fields demonstrates that such initiatives usually leave rural areas unserved or underserved.

Theoretically, competition supplies goods and services efficiently and at a lower cost. However, the lessons of competitive generation experiments in California, Texas, Pennsylvania and elsewhere are that competition does not necessarily bring benefits; instead, many have found that its burdens can be substantial. In fact, the Cooperatives are not aware of any state in the nation where competition could be used as a model or labeled as a success.

None of the current Electric Service Providers ("ESPs") have applied to the ACC for a CC&N to serve residential and small commercial customers due to their low load factor and profitability. As a result, the most profitable, higher load factor, large customers (important to the community of cooperative customers) will be the target market of the ESPs. If ESPs receive CC&Ns from the ACC and competition is allowed to proceed in Arizona, the few large customers will be "skimmed" or "cherry-picked" from each cooperative's service area. The unintended consequence of this is to burden the member owned system customers who remain. Due to the rural nature and low number of commercial loads on the Cooperative's systems, any loads lost will result in the remaining customers having to pay that portion of the fixed costs that was previously being paid by customers who choose direct access. Allowing the large customers to use direct access and the resulting shift in fixed costs to the remaining customers cannot be considered in the public interest of all customers. While the Cooperatives are continuously looking for ways to lower costs for all consumers, retail competition may decrease the costs for some but will eventually increase the costs for others.

The Cooperatives believe that if competitive wholesale and retail markets are developed in Arizona, the focus should be on the service areas served by APS, SRP and TEP where conditions are more favorable to competition. The Cooperatives serving the rural areas of the State should be exempted from the ACC's Retail Electric Competition Rules, at least in the near term until competition is demonstrated to be feasible and can be introduced in the Cooperatives' service territories without adverse impact.

The Retail Electric Competition Rules ("Rules") should be repealed as set forth in the Cooperatives' Comments for the reasons set forth therein and in these Comments.

III. Cooperatives Comments on Potential Risks and Benefits of Retail Electric Competition

In general, the rural areas are at a particular risk for reasons explained previously. Rural areas are generally not desirable markets. Further, the adverse impact on the fiscal integrity of the rural electric cooperative from loss of certain desirable and margin producing loads which help sustain the fiscal integrity of the member-owned cooperative business drives up costs for remaining financially unattractive and costly to serve customers. Managing those risks requires a recognition of these issues and special treatment concerning rural areas. The Cooperatives believe that Retail Electric Competition will not benefit rural Arizona and will only bring rate instability to these areas and a threat to the fiscal integrity of the cooperatives. Rate instability is an inherent risk in a truly free market. There is little that the Commission can do to minimize these risks without re-regulation.

Since the Cooperatives have only a few large loads and high load factor customers, competitive aggregators will most likely target and "cherry pick" these customers. No new

suppliers will find it profitable to aggregate the small but widely dispersed customers of the Cooperatives (5 – 15 customers per mile). Cooperatives, by their very nature of being "member-owned" are the aggregation entity. But unlike competitive ("investor-owned") ESPs, not-for-profit cooperatives are not in the business of returning a profit to investors, but instead, repatriate, where possible, margins to consumers. This is the only reason why electric service is possible in rural Arizona in the first place. Positive margins are returned to consumers which lowers the cost of electric service whenever possible.

IV. Shopping Risk – Provider of Last Resort

Both the risk and cost associated with shopping is sufficiently high so as to deter many small residential and commercial loads from undertaking the assignment. The Cooperatives believe that cost associated with shopping is not the most important factor to customers in making a competitive choice. What is most important to customers is electric service predictability and reliability and reasonable rates over the long term. For example, if customers could save 15 percent by choosing a competitive supplier but by doing so could be exposed to the risk that their costs could double at some time in the future, customers will not choose a competitive supplier. And how does a cooperative plan for generation if it must become a provider of last resort? And at what price and how is it amortized?

There are also providers of last resort risks associated with large customers who leave the Cooperatives' system and then want to return at a later date. Electric System Generation planning horizons span many years and cannot be modified in the span of a year to allow the return of large customers. This creates reliability concerns for the Cooperatives who currently are going to be the providers of last resort and who are required to serve these customers. The issues of the costs to return to Standard Offer service, provider of last resort and resource planning in an urban

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and in a rural competitive environment must all be addressed (and have not been) before competition can proceed.

V. Costs To Be Recovered

Finally, the issue of the costs to hire employees and modify accounting, billing and other systems to accommodate retail competition in the Cooperatives' service areas must be addressed. Currently APS and TEP need to recover millions of dollars of these types of costs from their customers with no corresponding benefits. The Cooperatives will incur costs for retail competition. Costs will be significant and paid by all the member customers for the benefit of only a few large customers who will be offered and able to choose competitive suppliers.

DATED this 29th day of January, 2009.

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